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1Secure and Energy-Efficient Beamforming for
Simultaneous Information and Energy Transfer
Ali A. Nasir, Hoang D. Tuan, Trung Q. Duong and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract—Next-generation communication networks will likely
involve the energy-efficient transfer of information and energy
over the same wireless channel, for which the physical layer
will become more vulnerable to cyber attacks by potential
multi-antenna eavesdroppers. To address this issue, this paper
considers transmit time-switching (TS) mode, in which energy
and information signals are transmitted separately in time by
the BS. This protocol is not only easy to implement but also
delivers the opportunity of multi-purpose beamforming, in which
energy beamformers during wireless power transfer are useful in
jamming the eavesdropper. In the presence of imperfect channel
estimation and multi-antenna eavesdroppers, the energy and
information beamformers and the transmit TS ratio are jointly
optimized to maximize the worst-case user secrecy rate subject
to UEs harvested energy thresholds and a BS transmit power
budget. New robust path-following algorithms, which involve one
simple convex quadratic program at each iteration are proposed
for computational solutions of this difficult optimization problem
and also the problem of secure energy efficiency maximization.
The latter is further complex due to additional optimization
variables appearing in the denominator of the secrecy rate
function. Numerical results confirm that the performance of the
proposed computational solutions is robust against the channel
uncertainties.
Index Terms—Secrecy rate, secrecy energy efficiency, wireless
power transfer, time switching, beamforming, nonconvex pro-
gramming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Next-generation communication networks offers the po-
tential to transfer information and energy through the same
wireless communication channel, where energy constrained
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users (UEs) would be able to not only receive information but
also harvest energy [1]–[3]. The information transfer generally
aims at high signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR)
while the energy transfer aims at a high-power ambient signal
[4], [5]. In early developments, information and energy are
excited to be transferred simultaneously (at the same time) by
the same signalling. To realize both wireless energy harvesting
(EH) and information decoding (ID), the user’s receivers need
to split the received signal for EH and ID either by power
splitting (PS) or time switching (TS) [6], [7]. Our recent result
in [8] shows that such protocol, particularly the PS approach
at the receiver, is not only complicated and inefficient for
practical implementation, but also not necessary. It is much
more efficient to transfer information and energy separately
and the users’s receivers do not need any sophisticated device.
Wireless power transfer is more viable in sensor-networks
or in dense small-cell deployment where there is closer prox-
imity between BS and UEs. Such densification of wireless
network make the wireless devices more vulnerable to ma-
licious cyber attacks than ever [9], [10]. The eavesdropper
can be more powerful as equipped by multi-antenna and in
favorable channel condition. The information intended to users
of less favorable channel condition can be vulnerably leaked.
Physical layer security aims to secure data transmissions
in such networks [11]–[13]. Many recent works considered
looking into the beamforming design problem to maximize
secrecy rate under the BS transmit power budget [14]–[17].
Beamforming requires the knowledge of downlink channels
to the UEs, which can be obtained via channel estimation.
Due to channel estimation errors in practical systems, the
BS cannot expect perfect channel knowledge, which demands
for robust beamforming design in the presence of channel
uncertainties [14], [16]. Adding wireless energy harvesting
(EH) feature due to its viability in dense small-cell deployment
introduces another EH constraint in secrecy rate optimization
problem [18]. As mentioned above, physical layer security
becomes more relevant in wireless information and power
transfer systems.
Robust beamforming design in the presence of channel
uncertainties with the same objective of secrecy rate max-
imization under receiver EH thresholds in addition to BS
transmit power budget was recently considered in [19]–[22].
Some of these works assume either only EH feature or only ID
capability at the UEs [20], [21], so there were no PS or TS
based simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) receivers. Assuming PS-based SWIPT receivers,
secrecy rate maximization was studied in [19], [22]. At griding
points of normal rates, these works employ semi-definite
2programming and alternating optimization, where rank-one
constraints have to be dropped and computationally complex
matrices have to be optimized. Randomization has to be
employed to achieve feasible beamforming vectors [22]. As
already pointed out by [23] while ago, such randomization
approach is not quite efficient. Moreover, with the existing
PS approach, it is well known that it is not practically easy
to implement variable range power splitter and also, one can
not jam the eavesdropper without transmitting artificial noise
[8]. In contrast, as shown in the present paper, our recently
proposed transmit TS approach [8] does not require to transmit
extra artificial noise thanks to the fact that power-bearing
signal sent during EH time can be simultaneously used to jam
the eavesdropper.
Meanwhile, energy efficiency (EE) in terms of bits per Joule
per Hertz is also a very important figure-of-merit in assessing
the practicability of next communication networks and beyond
(see e.g. [24]–[29]), where the Dinkelbach-type algorithm [30]
of fractional programming is the main tool for obtaining com-
putational solutions (see e.g. [31], [32] and references therein).
In the presence of eavesdroppers, secrecy energy efficiency
(SEE) maximization has been studied recently in [33], [34].
However, the approach to treat SEE in [33], [34] is based
on costly beamformers, which completely cancel the multi-
user interference and wiretapped signal at the eavesdroppers.
Moving step ahead, energy harvesting brings in conflicting
requirements form the viewpoint of EE, as it requires a
stronger transmit power. The problem of energy efficiency
maximization in SWIPT systems has been recently studied in
[35]–[37]. However, either the authors don’t consider simulta-
neous EH and ID capability [37] or assume PS based receiver
[35], [36]. To the best of our knowledge, computational
solution for robust beamforming design to achieve secrecy
rate and SEE optimization, particularly assuming practical TS-
based wireless EH systems, is still an open problem. The
SEE objective is not a ratio of concave and convex functions,
for which the Dinkelbach’s algorithm based approach is very
inefficient.
The subject of this paper is a multicell network, where
the UEs in each cell are divided into two groups depending
upon their distance from the serving BS. The one closer
to the BS take the advantage of higher received power to
perform wireless EH in addition to ID while the far-away
users only conduct ID. We consider imperfect channel state
information (CSI) case where the BSs have imperfect chan-
nel knowledge about UEs and eavesdroppers. We implement
transmit TS approach [8] where BS transmits information and
energy separately in different time portions and the energy
beamformers can be exploited to jam the eavesdroppers.1 In
the presence of channel uncertainties, we formulate the worst-
case based robust secrecy rate optimization problem. We solve
for joint optimization of information and energy beamforming
vectors with the transmit TS ratio, that could maximize the
1Though we propose transmit TS approach to solve max-min rate and power
minimization problems in [8], however, the extension of those developed
algorithms to solve robust secrecy rate and energy efficiency maximization
problem in the presence of eavesdroppers and channel estimation errors (as
will be detailed shortly in this paper) is highly non-trivial.
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Fig. 1. Downlink multiuser multicell interference scenario in a dense network
consisting of K small cells. For clarity, the intercell interference channels are
not shown, however, the interference occurs in all K cells.
minimum secrecy rate among all users, while ensuring EH
constraints for near-by users and transmit power constraints
at the BSs. The problem is very difficult computationally
due many challenging constraints, for which a path-following
algorithm is developed for its computational solution. The
algorithm does not require rank-constrained optimization and
converges quite quickly in few iterations. Through extensive
simulation, the achieved secrecy rate is shown to be close to
the normal rate that excludes the presence of eavesdroppers.
Furthermore, our numerical results confirm that performance
of the proposed algorithm is close to that of the perfect channel
knowledge case. In addition, the proposed algorithm not only
outperforms the existing algorithm that models power-splitting
(PS) based receiver but also the proposed transmit TS based
model is implementation-wise quite simple than the PS-based
model. In the end, we extend our development to solve and
analyze robust SEE maximization problem, which is further
complex due to additional function of optimization variables
in the denominator of secrecy rate function.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the problem formulation for maximizing the worst-case user
secrecy rate and its challenges, whereas Section III develops its
computational solution. Section IV proposes a computational
solution for the EE maximization. Section V evaluates the per-
formance of our proposed algorithms by numerical examples.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation. We use <{·} operator to denote the real part of
its argument, ∇ operator to denote the first-order differential
operator, and ‖x‖ and ‖X‖F to denote the Euclidean and
Frobenius norm of a vector x and matrix X, respectively. Also,
we define 〈x,y〉 , xHy.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
3Consider a multicell network consisting of K small cells la-
beled by k ∈ K , {1, . . . ,K}. As shown in Fig. 1, in each cell
k, a multi-antenna BS k with M antennas communicates with
Nk single-antenna users (UEs) (k, n), n ∈ Nk , {1, . . . , Nk}
over the same bandwidth. We divide the users in each cell k
into two zones, such that there are N1,k users located nearby
serving BS k in zone-1 and N2,k users are located far from
the BS k in zone-2, where Nk = N1,k +N2,k. By UE (k, n1)
and UE (k, n2), we mean UE n1 ∈ N1,k , {1, . . . , N1,k} in
zone-1 and UE n2 ∈ N2,k , {N1,k +1, . . . , Nk} in zone-2 of
cell k, respectively. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 1, we assume
that for UEs (k, n) of cell k, there is a single eavesdropper k
with Nev antennas in zone-1, who eavesdrops upon the signals
intended for UEs (k, n).
BSs intend to transfer energy to only their zone-1 users
since the latter are located sufficiently near to their serving
BSs and are able to practically harvest energy. Information
is transmitted to both zone-1 and zone-2 users. Denote by
xEk,n1 ∈ CM×1 and xIk,n ∈ CM×1 the EH beamforming vector
and ID beamforming vectors by BS k for its UE (k, n1) and
UE (k, n), respectively. The channel h˜k¯,k,n ∈ CM×1 between
BS k¯ and UE (k, n) is assumed to be frequency flat fading,
which counts the effects of both large-scale pathloss and small-
scale fading. Denote sEk,n1 and s
I
k,n as the energy signal and
information signal intended for UE (k, n1) and UE (k, n) by
BS k, with E{|sEk,n1 |2} = E{|sIk,n|2} = 1. Let 0 < η < 1 be
the time splitting for transferring energy and information to
UE. The baseband signal received by UE (k, n1) for EH is
yEk,n1 =
∑
k¯∈K
h˜Hk¯,k,n1
∑
n¯∈N1,k¯
xEk¯,n¯s
E
k¯,n¯ + z
a
k,n1 , (1)
where zak,n1 ∼ CN (0, σ2a) is the additive white complex Gaus-
sian noise, with zero-mean and variance σ2a, at the receiver of
UE (k, n). Using (1) and assuming a linear EH model2, the
harvested energy by the UE (k, n1) can be written as
Ek,n1(x
E , η) , ζk,n1ηpk,n1(xE), (2)
where
pk,n1(x
E) ,
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k¯
|h˜Hk¯,k,n1xEk¯,n¯|2 + σ2a, (3)
and ζk,n1 ∈ (0, 1) is the energy conversion efficiency for
the EH receiver. Here, we assume a common TS ratio η
for all BSs, k ∈ K, where near-by users harvest energy
through wireless signals not only from the serving BSs but
also from the neighboring BSs. Note that the harvested and
stored energy Ek,n1 may be used later for different power
constrained operations at UE (k, n1), e.g., assisting uplink data
transmission to the BS or performing downlink information
2The recently studied non-linear EH model and waveform design for
efficient wireless power transfer [38]–[40] is beyond the scope of this work,
but could be incorporated in future research.
processing. There and after xE , [xEk,n1 ]k∈K,n1∈N1,k . The
received signal by UE (k, n) for ID is
yIk,n = h˜
H
k,k,nx
I
k,ns
I
k,n + h˜
H
k,k,n
∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
xIk,n¯s
I
k,n¯
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
h˜Hk¯,k,n
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
xIk¯,n¯s
I
k¯,n¯ + z
a
k,n, (4)
where its first term represents the desired signal, while the
second and third terms are the intracell interference and
intercell interference. The BSs are assumed to perform chan-
nel estimation to acquire channel knowledge hk¯,k,n and the
channel state information (CSI) errors are bounded by the
uncertainty k¯,k,n as follows [41], [42]:
ρ(h˜k¯,k,nh˜
H
k¯,k,n − hk¯,k,nhHk¯,k,n) ≤ k¯,k,n, (5)
where ρ(A) is called the spectral radius of matrix A: ρ(A) =
maxi |λi(A)| with its eigenvalues λi(A), and the channel
uncertainties k¯,k,n are given by
k¯,k,n =
{
0‖hk¯,k,n‖2, k 6= k¯
1‖hk¯,k,n‖2, k = k¯,
(6)
where 0 and 1 are the normalized uncertainty levels related
to neighboring cells’ UEs and the serving cells’ UEs, respec-
tively.3 Note that (5) covers all uncertainty structures [42].
Thus, incorporating the channel uncertainties, the worst-case
information rate decoded by UE (k, n) is given by [42]
(1− η) log2(1 + SINR-UEk,n) ,
(1− η) log2
(
1 +
|hHk,k,nxIk,n|2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
)
, (7)
where xI , [xIk,n]k∈K,n∈Nk and
ϕk,n(x
I) ,
∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
|hHk,k,nxIk,n¯|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
intracell interference
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
|hHk¯,k,nxIk¯,n¯|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
intercell interference
+
∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
k,k,n‖xIk,n¯‖2
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
k¯,k,n‖xIk¯,n¯‖2 + σ2a. (8)
A multi-antenna eavesdropper with Nev antennas tries to
eavesdrop the intended signals for the UE (k, n). The signal
received at the EV k is composed of the signal received during
time fraction η, denoted by yEk ∈ CNev×1 and given by
yEk =
∑
k¯∈K
H˜Hk¯,k
∑
n¯∈N1,k¯
xEk¯,n¯s
E
k¯,n¯ + z
a
k ,
3We have introduced two different uncertainty levels because later we will
show in Section V that secrecy rate is more sensitive to the estimation errors of
serving users’ channels compared to that of the neighboring users’ channels.
4and the signal received at the EV k during time fraction 1−η,
denoted by yIk ∈ CNev×1 given by
yIk =
∑
k¯∈K
H˜Hk¯,k
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
xIk¯,n¯s
I
k¯,n¯ + z
a
k ,
where H˜k¯,k is the wiretap channel matrix of size M × Nev
between BS k¯ and UE k and zak ∈ CNev
(
0, σ2aINev
)
is noise
[10], [43]–[45]. Since the eavesdropper is not aware of the
time switching factor η, yEk is considered as an additional
noise to jam the eavesdropper. Therefore, the noise power at
EV k in decoding sIk,n is defined as
η
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k¯
‖H˜Hk¯,kxEk¯,n¯‖2
+(1− η)(
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
‖H˜Hk¯,kxIk¯,n¯‖2 − ‖H˜
H
k,kx
I
k,n‖2)
+Nevσ
2
a. (9)
We assume that the wiretap channel state information Hk¯,k
is available through channel estimation subject to some uncer-
tainty [41], [42]
ρ(H˜k¯,kH˜
H
k¯,k −Hk¯,kHHk¯,k) ≤ k¯,k, ∀k¯, k ∈ K, (10)
where k¯,k = 0‖Hk¯,k‖2F and 0 is the normalized uncertainty
level for the channels between BSs and the eavesdroppers.
Therefore, the worst received SINR at the EV k, corresponding
to the signal targeted for the UE (k, n), is given by [42]
SINR-EVk,n ,
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2
qk,n(x, η)
. (11)
where
qk,n(x, η) ,
η
(1− η)
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
‖HHk¯,kxEk¯,n¯‖2
−
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
k¯,k‖xEk¯,n¯‖2

+
∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
‖HHk,kxIk,n¯‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
‖HHk¯,kxIk¯,n¯‖2
−
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
k,k‖xIk,n¯‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
k¯,k‖xIk¯,n¯‖2

+Nevσ
2
a/(1− η),
(12)
where x ,
[
xE ;xI
]
.
The main attractive feature in (11)-(12) is that the EH
signals contribute very much to the denominator of the SINR
(11) at EV k, i.e. they are also used in jamming the EV k. The
secrecy rate expression for UE (k, n) in nat/sec/Hz is given
as [46]
fk,n(x, η) =
(1− η) ln(1 + SINR-UEk,n)− ln(1 + SINR-EVk,n) =
(1− η) ln
(
1 +
|hHk,k,nxIk,n|2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
)
− ln
(
1 +
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2
qk,n(x, η)
)
=
(1− η)f1k,n(xI)− f2k,n(x, η), (13)
where
f1k,n(x
I) , ln
(
1 +
|hHk,k,nxIk,n|2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
)
and
f2k,n(x, η) , ln
(
1 +
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2
qk,n(x, η)
)
.
The corresponding rate can be calculated in bits/sec/Hz units
by evaluating fk,n(x,η)ln 2 .
At first, we aim to jointly optimize the transmit information
and energy beamforming vectors, xEk,n1 and x
I
k,n, respectively,
and the TS ratio η to maximize the minimum (user with worst
channel conditions) secrecy rate
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1
η∈(0,1)
F (x, η) , min
k∈K,n∈Nk
fk,n(x, η) =
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
(1− η)f1k,n(xI)− f2k,n(x, η)
]
(14a)
s.t. gk(xk) , η
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2
+(1− η)
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , ∀k ∈ K, (14b)
g(x) , η
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2
+(1− η)
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2 ≤ Pmax, (14c)
pk,n1(x
E)− e
min
k,n1
ζk,n1η
≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, n1 ∈ N1,k, (14d)
‖xEk,n1‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , ‖xIk,n‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , (14e)
∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk,
where xk , [xEk,n1 ;x
I
k,n]n1∈N1,k,n∈Nk,∈K.
Constraint (14b) is the individual cell transmit power bud-
get, Pmaxk , at each BS k while constraint (14c) is the total
transmit power budget, Pmax, of the network. Constraint (14d)
requires that UE (k, n1) harvests energy is greater than some
preset target threshold emink,n1 . Constraint (14e) is imposed to
budget the beamforming power separately for each UE (k, n)
during both EH and ID times. Note that the objective (14a)
is highly non-concave while constraints (14b)-(14d) are non-
convex due to coupling between beamforming vectors x and
time splitting factor η.
5III. PROPOSED PATH-FOLLOWING COMPUTATION
In order to solve non-convex problem (14), we make the
variable change:
1− η = 1
µ
, (15)
which implies the following linear constraint
µ > 1. (16)
In what follows, we first transform the original max-min
secrecy rate problem (14) by using a new variable µ.
Transformation of Problem (14) by using a new variable µ:
Using (15), the power constraints (14b) and (14c) become the
following constraints:
g¯k(xk, µ) ,
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 +
1
µ
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2
− 1
µ
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2
≤ Pmaxk , ∀k ∈ K (17a)
g¯(x, µ) ,
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 +
1
µ
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2
− 1
µ
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2
≤ Pmax (17b)
and applying (15) in (14d), the EH constraint (14d) in variable
µ will become:
pk,n1(x
E) ≥ e
min
k,n1
ζk,n1
(
1 +
1
µ− 1
)
− σ2a. (18)
Under the variable change (13), the achievable secrecy rate in
new variable µ is given by
f¯k,n(x, µ) =
1
µ
f1k,n(x
I)− f¯2k,n(x, µ) (19)
where
f¯2k,n(x, µ) , ln
(
1 +
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2
q¯k,n(x, µ)
)
(20)
and by using qk,n(x, η) in (12), q¯k,n(x, µ) is defined as
follows:
q¯k,n(x, µ) ,
(µ− 1)
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
‖HHk¯,kxEk¯,n¯‖2
−
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
k¯,k‖xEk¯,n¯‖2

+
∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
‖HHk,kxIk,n¯‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
‖HHk¯,kxIk¯,n¯‖2
−
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
k,k‖xIk,n¯‖2
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
k¯,k‖xIk¯,n¯‖2
+ µNevσ2a. (21)
Using (17), (18), and (26), the equivalence of problem (14)
in variables x and µ is given by
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1,
µ
min
k∈K,
n∈Nk
[
1
µ
f1k,n(x
I)− f¯2k,n(x, µ)
]
(22a)
s.t. (14e), (16), (17), (18). (22b)
Inner Approximation of Power constraint (17) and EH
constraint (18):4 Let (x(`), µ(`)) be a feasible point for (22).
By exploiting the convexity of function 1µ‖x‖2, the following
inequality holds true
‖x‖2
µ
≥ 2<
{
(x(`))Hx
}
µ(`)
− ‖x
(`)‖2
(µ(`))2
µ, (23)
∀x ∈ CN ,x(`) ∈ CN , µ > 0, µ(`) > 0.
Thus using (23), an inner convex approximation of non-convex
constraints (17a) and (17b) is given by
g¯
(`)
k (xk, µ) ,
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 +
1
µ
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2
− 1
µ(`)
∑
n1∈N1,k
2<
{
(x
E,(`)
k,n1
)HxEk,n1
}
+
µ
(µ(`))2
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xE,(`)k,n1 ‖2
≤ Pmaxk , ∀k ∈ K, (24a)
g¯(`)(x, µ) ,
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2
+
1
µ
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2
− 1
µ(`)
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
2<
{
(x
E,(`)
k,n1
)HxEk,n1
}
+
µ
(µ(`))2
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xE,(`)k,n1 ‖2
≤ Pmax. (24b)
Next, following the definition of pk,n1(x
E) in (3), and using
the approximation
|hHk¯,k,nxk¯,n¯|2 ≥ −|hHk¯,k,nx(`)k¯,n¯|2
+ 2<
{(
x
(`)
k¯,n¯
)H
hk¯,k,nh
H
k¯,k,nxk¯,n¯
}
(25)
∀xk¯,n¯,x(`)k¯,n¯
an inner approximation of nonconvex constraint (18) is given
by ∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k¯
[
2<
{
hHk¯,k,n1x
E,(`)
k¯,n¯
hHk¯,k,n1x
E
k¯,n¯
}
−
∣∣∣hHk¯,k,n1xE,(`)k¯,n¯ ∣∣∣2] ≥
emink,n1
ζk,n1
(
1 +
1
µ− 1
)
− σ2a. (26)
4a constraint is called an inner approximation of another constraint if and
only if any feasible point of the former is also feasible for the latter [47]
6Using the convex approximations (24) and (26) for the
constraints of problem (22), we obtain the following inner
approximation at `th iteration:
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1,
µ
min
k∈K,
n∈Nk
[
1
µ
f1k,n(x
I)− f¯2k,n(x, µ)
]
(27a)
s.t. (14e), (16), (24a), (24b), (26). (27b)
As observed in [48], for x¯Ik,n = e
−.arg(hHk,k,nxIk,n)xIk,n, one
has |hHk,k,nxIk,n| = hHk,k,nx¯Ik,n = <{hHk,k,nx¯Ik,n} ≥ 0 and
|hHk′,k,n′xIk,n| = |hHk′,k,n′ x¯Ik,n| for (k′, n′) 6= (k, n) and  ,√−1. The problem (27) is thus equivalent to the following
optimization problem:
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1,
µ
F¯ (x, µ) , min
k∈K,
n∈Nk
f¯k,n(x, µ) =
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
f¯1k,n(x
I , µ)− f¯2k,n(x, µ)
]
(28a)
s.t. <{hHk,k,nxIk,n} ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (28b)
(14e), (24a), (24b), (26), (16), (28c)
where
f¯1k,n(x
I , µ) ,
1
µ
ln
(
1 +
(<{hHk,k,nxIk,n})2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
)
, (29)
Lower Approximation of the Objective (28a): For concave
lower approximation of f¯k,n(x, µ), which agrees with f¯k,n at(
w(`), µ(`)
)
, we provide a lower bounding concave function
for the first term f¯1k,n(x
I , µ) and an upper bounding convex
function for the second term f¯2k,n(x, µ). Recalling the defini-
tion (8) of ϕk,n(xI), we have the following result.
Theorem 1: A lower bounding concave function
f¯
1,(`)
k,n (x
I , µ) of f¯1k,n(x
I , µ), which agrees with f¯1k,n at
(x
I,(`)
k,n , µ
(`)), is given by
f¯1k,n(x
I , µ) ≥ f¯1,(`)k,n (xI , µ)
, a(`) − b(`) ϕk,n(x
I)
νk,n(xIk,n)
− c(`)µ (30)
for
νk,n(x
I
k,n) ≤ ψk,n(xIk,n)− k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2, (31a)
∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk,
νk,n ≥ 0 , ψk,n ≥ 0 , ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (31b)
where
a(`) = 2
ln(1 + d(`))
µ(`)
+
d(`)
µ(`)(d(`) + 1)
> 0,
b(`) =
(d(`))2
µ(`)(d(`) + 1)
> 0,
c(`) =
ln(1 + d(`))
(µ(`))2
> 0,
d(`) = ((<{hHk,k,nxI,(`)k,n })2
−0||xI,(`)k,n ||2)/ϕk,n(xI,(`))
(32)
and
ψk,n(x
I
k,n) , 2<{hHk,k,nxI,(`)k,n }<
{
hHk,k,nx
I
k,n
}
−
(
<
{
hHk,k,nx
I,(`)
k,n
})2
. (33)
The upper bounding convex function f¯2,(`)k,n (x, µ) on
f¯2k,n(x, µ), which agrees with f¯
2
k,n at (x
(`), µ(`), is given
by
f¯2k,n(x, µ) ≤ f¯2,(`)k,n (x, µ)
, f¯2k,n(w(`), µ(`))
+
(
1 +
‖HHk,kwI,(`)k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
)−1
×
(
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2√
βk,n
− ‖H
H
k,kw
I,(`)
k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
)
(34)
where
βk,n > 0, ∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk (35)√
βk,n ≤ q¯k,n(x, µ), ∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (36)
where constraint (36) is innerly approximated by the con-
straint:
1
2
 βk,n√
β
(`)
k,n(µ
(`) − 1)
+
√
β
(`)
k,n(µ
(`) − 1)
(µ− 1)2
 ≤ q¯(`)k,n(x, µ) (37)
and
2µ(`) − 1− µ > 0. (38)
for √
β
(`)
k,n = q¯k,n(x
(`), µ(`)) (39)
and
q¯
(`)
k,n(x, µ) ,
− 1
µ− 1
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
k,k‖xIk,n¯‖2
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
k¯,k‖xIk¯,n¯‖2
−∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
k¯,k‖xEk¯,n¯‖2
+
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
<
{〈
HHk¯,kxE,(`)k¯,n¯ , 2HHk¯,kx
E,(`)
k¯,n¯
xEk¯,n¯
−HHk¯,kxE,(`)k¯,n¯
〉}
+
2
µ(`) − 1
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
<
{〈
HHk,kxI,(`)k,n¯ ,HHk,kxIk,n¯
〉}
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
<
{〈
HHk¯,kxI,(`)k¯,n¯ ,HHk¯,kxIk¯,n¯
〉}
7Algorithm 1 Path-following Algorithm for Secrecy Rate Op-
timization (14)
1: Initialize ` := 0.
2: Find a feasible point
(
xE,(0),xI,(0), µ(0)
)
of (22).
3: repeat
4: Solve convex problem (41) to find(
xE,(`+1),xI,(`+1), µ(`+1)
)
.
5: Set ` := `+ 1.
6: until the objective in (22) converges.
− µ− 1
(µ(`) − 1)2
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
‖HHk,kxI,(`)k,n¯ ‖2
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
‖HHk¯,kxI,(`)k¯,n¯ ‖2

+
(
1 +
2
µ(`) − 1 −
µ− 1
(µ(`) − 1)2
)
Nevσ
2
a.
(40)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Thus, by applying Theorem 1, we can use the follow-
ing convex quadratic program (QP) to achieve minorant
maximization for the nonconvex problem (28) at feasible
(x
E,(`)
k,n ,x
I,(`)
k,n , µ
(`)):
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1,
µ
min
k∈K,
n∈Nk
[
f¯
1,(`)
k,n (x
I , µ)− f¯2,(`)k,n (x, µ)
]
(41a)
s.t. (14e), (24a), (24b), (26), (16), (28b),
(31), (35), (37), (38). (41b)
Details of Proposed Algorithm 1 with its Initialization: The
proposed computation for the max-min secrecy rate problem
(22) (and hence (14)) is summarized in Algorithm 1. Since
the objective function in (41) agrees with that in (22) at
(x(`), µ(`)), which is also feasible for (41), it follows that
min
k∈K,
n∈Nk
[
1
µ(`+1)
f¯1k,n(x
I,(`+1))− f¯2k,n(x(`+1), µ(`+1))
]
≥
min
k∈K,
n∈Nk
[
f¯
1,(`)
k,n (x
I,(`+1), µ(`+1))− f¯2,(`)k,n (x(`+1), µ(`+1))
]
>
min
k∈K,
n∈Nk
[
f¯
1,(`)
k,n (x
I,(`), µ(`))− f¯2,(`)k,n (x(`), µ(`))
]
=
min
k∈K,
n∈Nk
[
1
µ(`)
f¯1k,n(x
I,(`))− f¯2k,n(x(`), µ(`))
]
,
(42)
i.e. (x(`+1), µ(`+1)) is a feasible point, which is better than
(x(`), µ(`)) for (22), whenever (x(`+1), µ(`+1)) 6= (x(`), µ(`)).
On the other hand, if (x(`+1), µ(`+1)) = (x(`), µ(`)), i.e.
(x(`), µ(`)) is the optimal solution of the convex optimization
problem (41) then it must satisfy the first order necessary
optimality condition for (41), which obviously is also the
first order necessary optimality condition for (22). We thus
proved that the sequence {(x(`), µ(`))} converges to a point
satisfying the first order necessary optimality condition for the
nonconvex optimization problem (22).
A feasible point
(
xE,(0),xI,(0), µ(0)
)
for (22) (and hence
(14)) for initializing Algorithm 1 is found as as follows. We
first fix µ(0) and solve the following convex problem:
max
xx
k,n
∈CM×1,
x∈{I,E}
min
k∈K,
n∈Nk
<{hHk,k,nxEk,n1}
−
√
emink,n /
(
ζk,n
(
1− 1/µ(0))) (43a)
s.t. ‖xEk,n1‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , ‖xIk,n‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , (43b)
∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk,
<{hHk,k,nxIk,n} ≥√erminµ(0) − 1
×
∥∥∥∥∥ σa(hHk¯,k,nxIk¯,n¯)k¯,n¯∈K,N\{k,n}
∥∥∥∥∥
2
, (43c)
k ∈ K, n ∈ N ,
g¯k
(
xk, µ
(0)
)
≤ Pmaxk , ∀k ∈ K, (43d)
g¯
(
x, µ(0)
)
≤ Pmax, (43e)
where, for rapid convergence, the constraint (43c) on the
information rate of UE (k, n) is imposed. Note that the
constraint (18) is satisfied if the objective function (43a) is
positive. The constraint (43c) is a second-order cone constraint
[49]. Using the optimal solution xE,(0)k,n of (43) as the initial
point, we then iteratively solve the following convex program:
max
xx
k,n
∈CM×1,
x∈{I,E}
min
k∈K,
n∈Nk
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
[
2<
{
hHk¯,k,nx
E,(`)
k¯,n¯
hHk¯,k,nx
E
k¯,n¯
}
−
∣∣∣hHk¯,k,nxE,(`)k¯,n¯ ∣∣∣2]− emink,nζk,n
(
1 +
1
µ(0) − 1
)
− σ2a
s.t. (43b), (43c), (43d), (43e). (44)
until a positive value of the objective function is achieved.
If either problem (43) is found infeasible or an positive
value by solving (44) is not found, we use different value
of µ(0) and repeat the above process until a feasible point(
xE,(0),xI,(0), µ(0)
)
is obtained.5
IV. ENERGY EFFICIENT SECURE BEAMFORMING
This section extends the proposed robust secrecy rate max-
imization algorithm to solve the secrecy energy efficiency
(SEE) maximization problem, which is formulated in the
presence of channel estimation errors and eavesdroppers as
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1
η∈(0,1)
min
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
[(1− η)f1k,n(xI)− f2k,n(x, η)]
1
ξ gk(xk, η) +MPA + Pc
s.t. (14b), (14c), (14d), (14e), (45a)
(1− η)f1k,n(xI)− f2k,n(x, η) ≥ rk,n,∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (45b)
where ξ is the constant power amplifier efficiency, PA is the
power dissipation at each transmit antenna, Pc is the fixed
5Our simulation results in Sec. V show that the initialization problems (43)
or (44) are feasible, and in almost all of the scenarios considered, we achieve
a positive optimal value of (44) in one single iteration and with the first tried
value of µ(0) = 1.11.
8circuit power consumption for base-band processing and rk,n
is the threshold secrecy rate to ensure quality of service. The
security and energy efficiency are combined into a single
objective in (45a) to express the so-called secrecy EE (SEE)
in terms of secrecy bits per Joule per Hertz.
The conventional approach to address (45) (see e.g. [31],
[32]) is based on the Dinkelbach’s method of fractional
programming [30] to find τ > 0 such that the optimal value
of the following optimization problem is zero
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1
η∈(0,1)
min
k∈K
{ ∑
n∈Nk
[(1− η)f1k,n(xI)
−f2k,n(x, η)]− τ [
1
ξ
gk(xk, η) +MPA + Pc]
}
s.t. (14b), (14c), (14d), (14e), (45b). (46)
However, for each fixed τ > 0, the optimization problem
(46) is highly nonconvex convex and thus is still difficult
computationally. It is important to realize that the original
Dinkelbach’s method [30] is attractive only for maximizing
a ratio of a convex and concave functions over a convex set,
under which each subproblem for fixed τ is an easy convex
optimization problem. It is hardly useful whenever either the
objective is not ratio of a concave and convex function or the
constrained set is not convex.
We now develop an efficient path-following computational
procedure for solution of (45), which bypasses such difficult
optimization problem (46). Using the variable change (16)
again, this problem is equivalent to
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1
µ>1,tk>0
min
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
[
f1k,n(x
I)
µ
√
tk
− f¯
2
k,n(x, µ)√
tk
] (47a)
s.t. (14e), (17), (18), (16),
f¯1k,n(x
I , µ)− f¯2k,n(x, µ) ≥ rk,n ∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (47b)
1
ξ
g¯k(xk, µ) +MPA + Pc ≤
√
tk,∀ k ∈ K, (47c)
By using (30) we obtain
f1k,n(x
I)
µ
√
tk
≥ A(`) −B(`) ϕk,n(x
I)
νk,n(xIk,n)
− C(`)µ√tk
≥ Φ(`)k,n(x, µ, tk)
, A(`) −B(`) ϕk,n(x
I)
νk,n(xIk,n)
−C(`)

√
t
(`)
k
2µ(`)
µ2 +
µ(`)
2
√
t
(`)
k
tk
 (48)
for (31), where
√
t
(`)
k = g¯k(x
(`)
k , µ
(`)) +MPA + Pc and
A(`) = 2
ln(1 +D(`))
µ(`)
√
t
(`)
k
+
D(`)
µ(`)
√
t
(`)
k (D
(`) + 1)
> 0,
B(`) =
(D(`))2
µ(`)
√
t
(`)
k (D
(`) + 1)
> 0,
C(`) =
ln(1 +D(`))
[µ(`)
√
t
(`)
k ]
2
> 0,
D(`) = ((<{hHk,k,nxI,(`)k,n })2 − 0||xI,(`)k,n ||2)/ϕk,n(xI,(`)).
Similarly to (34), we have
f¯2k,n(x, µ)√
tk
≤ f¯
2
k,n(w
(`), µ(`))√
tk
+
(
1 +
‖HHk,kwI,(`)k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
)−1
×
(
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2√
tkβk,n
−‖H
H
k,kw
I,(`)
k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
√
tk
)
(49)
≤ Ψ(`)k,n(x, µ, tk), (50)
with (35), (36) and
0 < tk ≤ 3t(`)k , ∀ k ∈ K, (51)
where
Ψ
(`)
k,n(x, µ, tk) ,
f¯2k,n(w
(`), µ(`))√
tk
+
(
1 +
‖HHk,kwI,(`)k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
)−1
×
(
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2√
tkβk,n
−‖H
H
k,kw
I,(`)
k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
2q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
√
t
(`)
k
(
3− tk
t
(`)
k
) (52)
For the approximation (50) under (51), we have used the
following inequality
1√
t
≥ 1
2
√
t¯
(
3− t
t¯
)
∀ t > 0, t¯ > 0.
The inner approximations in (48) and (50) can be easily
followed by using the procedure in Appendix A. The following
convex program is minorant maximization for the nonconvex
program (47)
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1
µ>1,tk>0
min
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
[Φ
(`)
k,n(x, µ, tk))
−Ψ(`)k,n(x, µ, tk)] (53a)
s.t. (14e), (24a), (24b), (26), (16), (28b), (31),
(35), (51), (37), (38), (53b)
f¯
1,(`)
k,n (x
I , µ)− f¯2,(`)k,n (x, µ) ≥ rk,n, ∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (53c)
1
ξ
g¯
(`)
k (xk, µ) +MPA + Pc ≤
√
tk,∀ k ∈ K. (53d)
Algorithm 2 outlines the steps to solve max-min energy effi-
ciency problem (47) (and hence (45)). Similar to Algorithm 1,
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Fig. 2. A multicell network setup used in our numerical examples
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Algorithm 2 Path-following Algorithm for SEE Optimization
(45)
1: Initialize ` := 0.
2: Find a feasible point
(
xE,(0),xI,(0), t(0), µ(0)
)
of (47).
3: repeat
4: Solve convex program (53) for(
xE,(`+1),xI,(`+1), t(`+1)µ(`+1)
)
.
5: Set ` := `+ 1.
6: until the objective in (47) converges.
Algorithm 2 generates a sequence
{(
xE,(`),xI,(`), t(`), µ(`)
)}
of improved points of (53), which converges to a KKT
point, where t(`) , [t(`)1 , . . . , t
(`)
K ]
T . A feasible point(
xE,(0),xI,(0), t(0), µ(0)
)
of (27) (and hence (45)) for ini-
tializing Algorithm 2 can be obtained by first solving (43)
and (44) followed by a feasibility problem (53b), (53c), and
(53d). It was already reported in Section III that how efficiently
the solution of (43) and (44) is obtained. The solution to the
feasibility problem (53b), (53c), and (53d) is mostly obtained
at the first iteration.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To analyze the proposed algorithms through simulations,
a network topology as shown in Fig. 2 is set up. There
are K = 3 cells and N = Nk = 4, ∀ k ∈ K UEs
per cell with two placed inside the inner-circle in zone-1
and the remaining two placed in the outer zone near cell-
edges, i.e., N1,k = N2,k = 2, ∀ k. The cell radius is
set to be 40m with inner circle radius of 15m. A single
Nev = 2-antennas eavesdropper is randomly placed inside
the inner circle in each cell. The path loss exponent is set
to be µ = 3. We generate Rician fading channels with Rician
factor, KR = 10 dB [3]. For simplicity, set emink,n1 ≡ emin
for the energy harvesting thresholds and ζk,n1 ≡ ζ, ∀k, n1
for the energy harvesting conversion. Further, we set energy
conversion efficiency ζ = 0.5, noise variance σ2a = −90 dBm
(unless specified otherwise), maximum BS transmit power
Pmaxk = 26 dBm, ∀ k, which is in line with the frequently
made assumption for the power budget of small-cell BSs [50].
We choose the value Pmax = 30 dBm of the power budget
for the whole network. Unless stated otherwise, we choose the
uncertainty in eavesdroppers’ and neighboring users’ channels,
0 = 0.005 and we choose the uncertainty in serving users’
channels 1 = 10−3. It is justified to assume that BSs can
achieve good channel estimates for their serving cell users
compared to the neighboring cell users in a dense small cell
network. Later in this section, we also investigate the effect
of different values of channel uncertainties on the achievable
secrecy rate. For energy efficiency maximization problem in
Section IV, we choose power amplifier efficiency ξ = 0.2, is
the power dissipation at each transmit antenna PA = 0.6W
(27.78 dBm), and circuit power consumption Pc = 2.5W
(33.97 dBm) [37], [51]. We set the threshold secrecy rate
rk,n = 0.1 bits/sec/Hz for M = 4 antennas at the BS and
otherwise rk,n = 0.5 bits/sec/Hz for M ∈ {5, 6} antenna-
BSs.
The convergence of Algorithm 1 for M = 5 antenna BS
and minimum energy harvesting threshold emin = −20 dBm
is shown by Fig. 3. We can see that for some fixed channel,
whether we assume perfect channel estimation 0 = 0, 1 = 0
or assume some channel uncertainty 0 = 0.005, 0 = 10−3,
Algorithm 1 converges within 20 − 25 iterations. We also
observe that if we assume the absence of eavesdropper, Algo-
rithm 1 quickly converges in about 4 iterations. On average,
Algorithm 1 requires 22.5 iterations before convergence, while
the absence of eavesdroppers drops down the average required
number of iterations to 3.5. The slower convergence in the
presence of eavesdroppers is expected since then, not only
the objective (41a) gets quite complicated, but also new
constraints, (35), (37), and (38) are required to be satisfied.
The worst secrecy and normal rates (in the absence of
eavesdroppers) for both perfect channel estimation 0 = 0,
1 = 0 and with the presence of channel uncertainty of
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0 = 0.005, 1 ∈ 10−3 are provided by Figs. 4 and 5.
Basically, the secrecy rate by Algorithm 1 is compared with the
normal rate. The latter excludes eavesdroppers and accordingly
the optimization problem (14) with f2k,n(x, η) ≡ 0 in (14a) is
solved. The dashed curves in Figs. 4 and 5 have been plotted
to refer to the presence of channel uncertainties, while solid
line curves refer to the absence of channel uncertainty 0 = 0,
1 = 0. We can observe from Figs. 4 and 5 that the proposed
robust secrecy rate algorithm in the presence of channel
uncertainties perform quite well and close to the case that
assumes perfect channel estimation. However, the performance
gap increases by increasing the number of antennas as can
be seen from Fig. 4. It is expected because increasing the
number of antennas, say from M = 4 to M = 5 increases
the channel uncertainty in additional KN = 12 channel co-
efficients. Moreover, we observe that the optimized rate by the
proposed Algorithm 1 is quite close to that achieved by the
modified algorithm, which assumes absence of eavesdroppers
in Algorithm 1. Fig. 4 plots the rate for different number of BS
antennas M ∈ {4, 5, 6} with fixed EH threshold emin = −20
dBm, while Fig. 5 plots the rate for varying values of EH
targets emin ∈ {−25,−20, . . . , 0} dBm with fixed number of
antennas at the BS M = 5. In Fig. 4, we observe almost
linear increase in the achievable rate with increase in the
number of BS antennas. In Fig. 5, we observe decrease in
the achievable rate with the increase in the EH targets. This is
because higher EH targets demands for more power from the
BS to perform energy harvesting, which results in the decrease
in the available power for information decoding, thus decreases
the achievable information rate. Overall, Figs. 4 and 5 indicate
the robustness of our proposed Algorithm 1.
Fig. 6 plots the worst secrecy and normal rates (in the
absence of eavesdroppers) versus different levels of channel
uncertainty in neighboring users’ channels and the eaves-
droppers’ channels 0 = {10−5, . . . , 10−2} for fixed 1 =
10−3, while Fig. 7 plots such rates versus different lev-
els of channel uncertainty in serving BS users’ channels
0 = {10−5, . . . , 10−2} for fixed 0 = 0.005. We set energy
harvesting threshold emin = −20 dBm and number of BS
antennas M = 5. We can observe from Figs. 6 and 7
that the optimized rate is almost un-affected for low channel
uncertainties {10−5, . . . , 10−3}, and is slightly reduced if
channel uncertainty is increased to the level of 10−2. This
advocates the robustness of Algorithm 1. Even for wide range
of values of channel uncertainty 0, the optimized secrecy
rate by Algorithm 1 is quite close to that achieved by the
modified algorithm, which assumes absence of eavesdroppers
in Algorithm 1.
Fig. 8 compares the secrecy rate performance of the pro-
posed transmit TS-based system with that of the power split-
ting (PS)-based system [18] under the perfect channel state
information (0 = 0, 1 = 0). For the PS-based receiver in
[18], we set the ID circuit noise variance σ2c to be −90 dBm
and the antenna noise variance σ2a = −90 dBm. Thus, for fair
comparison in Fig. 8, we add σ2c to σ
2
a, i.e., σ
2
a = −87 dBm,
for plotting the result for our proposed TS-based Algorithm 1.
Fig. 8 plots the worst secrecy rate versus number of antennas
M for fixed energy harvesting threshold emin = −20 dBm.
We can clearly observe a gain of around 0.5 bits/sec/Hz
in the achieved secrecy rate of Algorithm 1 compared to
that of the algorithm in [18]. Note that the proposed TS-
based system not only enjoys the performance gain, but
also promises implementation simplicity. The average number
of iterations required for convergence are almost same for
both Algorithm 1 and the algorithm in [18]. However, the
proposed TS-based system model has a two-fold advantage;
it not only enjoys the performance gain, but also promises
implementation simplicity, as motivated in the Introduction in
Section I.
The computational complexity of the proposed Algorithm 1
is O (iA1(MK(N +N1) + 1)3 (7KN +(K + 2) + 3KN1))
[52]. Here, iA1 = 22.5 is the average number of times that (41)
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energy harvesting threshold emin = −20 dBm and BS antennas M = 5.
TABLE I
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED TS-BASED ALG. 1 AND PS-BASED ALGORITHM IN [18] FOR GENERAL M , N , K , AND SPECIFIC M = 4,
N = 4, K = 3 CASES.
Algorithms avg. # iter scalar variables linear constraints quadratic constraints
Algorithm 1 22.5 MK(N +N1) + 1 = 73 3KN +KN1 + (K + 1) = 46 4KN + 2KN1 + 1 = 61
PS Algorithm [18] 16 MK(N + 1) +KN1 = 66 K + 1 = 4 KN + 3KN1 = 30
is solved by Algorithm 1. Table I shows the average number of
iterations, scalar variables, and linear and quadratic constraints
required to solve per iteration by the proposed Algorithm 1 and
the PS-based algorithm in [18]. We can observe that though
the PS-based algorithm in [18] requires the solution of fewer
quadratic and linear constraints, it is not practically easy to
implement a variable range power splitter. Thus, the proposed
TS-based Algorithm 1 provides a practical solution to secure
and robust beamforming.
Finally, the performance of our proposed SEE Algorithm
2 is evaluated. Fig. 9 shows the convergence of proposed
Algorithm 2 for M = 5 antennas at the BS and energy
harvesting threshold emin = −20 dBm. We can see that
for some fixed channel, whether we assume perfect channel
estimation 0 = 0, 1 = 0 or assume some channel uncertainty
0 = 0.005, 0 = 10−3, Algorithm 2 converges within 20−25
iterations. On average, Algorithm 2 requires approximately
18.5 iterations for convergence.
Figs. 10 and 11 plot the secrecy energy efficiency and
normal energy efficiency (in the absence of eavesdroppers)
for both perfect channel estimation 0 = 0, 1 = 0 and with
the presence of channel uncertainty of 0 = 0.005, 1 = 10−3.
Here, the achievable SEE for Algorithm 2 is compared with
the normal EE assuming no eavesdroppers, that is obtained
by solving the optimization problem (45) with f2k,n(x, η) ≡ 0.
The dashed curves in Figs. 10 and 11 refer to the presence
of channel uncertainties 0 = 0.005, 1 = 10−3, while
solid line curves refer to the absence of channel uncertainty
0 = 1 = 0. We can observe from Figs. 10 and 11 that
the optimized EE by the proposed Algorithm 2 is quite close
to that achieved by the modified algorithm, which assumes
absence of eavesdroppers in Algorithm 2. Finally, we observe
from Fig. 10 that for perfect channel estimation, the optimized
EE increases by increasing the number of antennas, as per
expectation, however, in the presence of channel uncertainties,
the EE decreases with the increase in the number of antennas.
In order to investigate this, we have figure*d out the numerator
and denominator of EE function separately in the next two
figure*s.
In Figs. 12 and 13, we plot the numerator and denominator
of the EE function, (45a), respectively, where numerator of EE
corresponds to the sum-rate of the worst cell and denominator
of EE corresponds to the total power, 1ξ gk(xk, η)+MPA+Pc,
of the worst cell’s BS. First, we can obersve from Fig. 13
that denominator of EE function increases with the increase
in the number of antennas. This This is because increase in
the number of antennas increases the non-transmission power
MPA in the denominator of EE function, (45a). Next, we
can observe from Fig. 12 that though the numerator part of
EE function also increases with the increase in the number of
antennas, however, the numerator part increases swiftly for the
prefect channel estimation case (solid lines) when compared
to its slow increase in the presence of channel uncertainties
(dashed lines). This results in slight decrease in the EE with
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the increase in the number of antennas in the presence of
erroneous estimates, as shown in Fig. 10.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Considering simple and efficient transmit TS approach to
ensure wireless energy harvesting and information decoding in
a dense multi-cell network, we have proposed robust secrecy
rate and secrecy energy efficiency maximization algorithms
in the presence of multi-antenna eavesdroppers and channel
estimation errors. Our robust optimization algorithm jointly
designs for transmit energy and information beamformers
at the BSs and the transmit TS ratio with the objective
of maximizing the worst-case user secrecy rate under BS
transmit power and UE minimum harvested energy constraints.
The problem is very challenging due to nonconvex objective
and numerous non-convex constraints. We have solved it
by a new robust path-following algorithm, which involves
one simple convex quadratic program in each iteration. We
have also extended our algorithm to solve for worst cell
secrecy EE maximization problem under secrecy rate quality-
of-service constraints, which is further complex due to addi-
tional function of optimization variables in the denominator
of secrecy rate function. Our numerical results confirm the
merits of the proposed algorithms as their performance is quite
close to that of the case where there are no eavesdroppers.
Moreover, the proposed algorithm not only outperforms the
existing algorithm that models PS based receiver but also the
proposed transmit TS based model is implementation-wise
quite simple than the PS-based model. Finally, we would like
to hint towards an open future research direction from this
work, in which the proposed algorithms could be modified to
accommodate only channel distribution knowledge about the
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eavesdroppers. The rate-energy trade-off between transmit-TS
and receive-PS approaches could also be considered in future
research.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first prove (30) by using the following inequality for all
x > 0, x¯ > 0, t > 0 and t¯ > 0
ln(1 + 1/x)
t
≥ f(x¯, t¯) + 〈∇f(x¯, t¯), (x, t)− (x¯, t¯)〉
= 2
ln(1 + 1/x¯)
t¯
+
1
t¯(x¯+ 1)
− x
(x¯+ 1)x¯t¯
− ln(1 + 1/x¯)
t¯2
t. (A.1)
which follows from the convexity of function ln(1+1/x)t .
By subsituting 1/x→ x and 1/x¯→ x¯ in (A.1), we have:
ln(1 + x)
t
≥ a− b
x
− ct, (A.2)
where a = 2 ln(1+x¯)t¯ +
x¯
t¯(x¯+1) > 0, b =
x¯2
t¯(x¯+1) > 0, c =
ln(1+x¯)
t¯2 > 0. From that,
1
µ
ln
1 +
(
<{hHk,k,nxIk,n}
)2
− k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
 ≥
a(`) − b(`) ϕk,n(x
I)(
<
{
hHk,k,nx
I
k,n
})2
− k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
− c(`)µ,
(A.3)
where a(`), b(`), c(`), and d(`) are defined in (32). Now, using
(<{hHk,k,nxIk,n})2 ≥ ψk,n(xIk,n) with ψk,n(xIk,n) ≥ 0 defined
in (33), together with (A.3) leads to
1
µ
ln
1 +
(
<
{
hHk,k,nx
I
k,n
})2
− k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
 ≥
a(`) − b(`) ϕk,n(x
I)
νk,n(xIk,n)
− c(`)µ ,
f¯
1,(`)
k,n (x
I , µ) (A.4)
for 0 ≤ νk,n(xIk,n) ≤ ψk,n(xIk,n) − 0||xIk,n||2, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈
Nk. The function f¯1,(`)k,n (xI , µ) is concave on (31).
Next, (34) follows from the following inequality
ln(1 + t) ≤ ln(1 + t′) + (t− t′)/(1 + t′) ∀t ≥ 0, t′ ≥ 0,
which is a consequence of the concavity of function ln(1+ t).
Now, it remains to prove (21). By substituting q¯k,n(x, µ),
defined in (21), into the constraint (36), we have:√
βk,n
µ− 1 +
1
µ− 1
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
k,k‖xIk,n¯‖2
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
k¯,k‖xIk¯,n¯‖2
+ ∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
k¯,k‖xEk¯,n¯‖2 ≤∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
‖HHk¯,kxEk¯,n¯‖2
+
1
µ− 1
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
‖HHk,kxIk,n¯‖2
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
‖HHk¯,kxIk¯,n¯‖2
+ (1 + 1
µ− 1)Nevσ
2
a, (A.5)
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where right hand side of (A.5) is convex which can be
linearized for inner approximation by using [49]
‖x‖2
y
≥ 2<
{
(x(`))Hx
}
y(`)
− ‖x
(`)‖2y(
y(`)
)2 , (A.6)
∀x ∈ CN ,x(`) ∈ CN , y > 0, y(`) > 0,
‖x‖2 ≥ 2<
{
(x(`))Hx
}
− ‖x(`)‖2, (A.7)
∀x ∈ CN ,x(`) ∈ CN (A.8)
and
1
µ− 1 ≥
2
µ(`) − 1 −
µ− 1
(µ(`) − 1)2 . (A.9)
The first term in the left hand side of (A.5) is nonconvex,
which is convexified by using the fact that
√
xy is concave
in x and y, i.e.,
√
xy ≤
√
s(`)y
2
√
y(`)
+
√
y(`)x
2
√
s(`)
. Thus,
√
βk,n
µ−1 is
approximated as√
βk,n
µ− 1 ≤
1
2
 βk,n√
β
(`)
k,n(µ
(`) − 1)
+
√
β
(`)
k,n(µ
(`) − 1)
(µ− 1)2

(A.10)
Thus, using (A.6), (A.7), (A.9), and (A.10) in (A.5), we can
get the approximation (37).
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